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I 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GARY ROGERS, by his Guardian ad 
litem, RALPH A. ROGERS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
Case No. 
7586 
I 
1 JO ANX WAGSTAFF, PAUL L. 
• \YAGST.AFF and \Y. E. LEilfMON, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents accept the Statement of Facts as given 
by Appellant except that the action was to recover 
damages resulting from an accident and in ;p,laintiff's 
complaint it is alleged that the defendtant JoAnn Wag-
staff drove a motor vehicle .against plaintiff. (R. 2) 
STATEilfENT OF POINTS 
THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY IMPOSED BY THE 
STATUTE (57-4-12 Utah Code Annotated 1943) IS AFFECTED 
BY THE MARRIAGE OF AN APPLICANT UNDER THE 
AGE OF EIGHTEEN YEARS OR A CHANGE IN CUSTODY 
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OF ANi APPLICANT· BY VJRTUE OF A DE·CREE OF DI-
VORCE, THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN GRANTING A SUMMARY. J.UUGMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY IMPOSED BY THE 
STATUTE (57-4-12 Utah Code Annotated 1943) IS AFFECTED 
BY THE MARRIAGE OF AN APPLICANT UNDER THE 
AGE OF EIGHTEEN YEARS OR A CHANGE IN CUSTODY 
OF AN APPLI·CANT BY VIRTUE OF A DECREE OF DI-
VORCE, THEREFOR·E, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN GRANTING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
It is defendants' contention that upon the marriage 
of J o Ann Wagstaff, said J o• Ann Wagstaff became 
under the law an adult person fully responsible for her 
own acts, and that the provisions of Section 57-4-12, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, pertaining to the application 
of minors under the .age of 18 yea;rs for driver's licenses 
is not applicable. Section 57-4-12, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, provides as follows: 
'' (a) The applications of any persons under 
the age of eighteen years for an instruction permit 
or operator's license shall he signed and verified 
before a person authorized to administer oaths by 
the father of the applicant, if the father is living 
and has custody of the applicant, otherwise by the 
mother or guardian having custody of swch minor,. 
or in the event that a miwor has no father, mother 
or guardian,, then an operator's license shall not 
he granted to the mirvor unless the application is 
signed by an employer of such minor or by some 
other responsible person who is willing to as.sume 
the obligation imposed under this act upon a per-
son signing the application of a minor. 
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.. (b) .Any ne9ligence or ·willful misoonduct 
of a minor under the aqe of ei9llfeen years when 
driving a n1otor Yehicle upon a highway shall be 
iinputed to the person who has signed the appli-
eation of such minor for a permit or license, which 
person ~hall be jointly and severally liable with 
such minor for any da1nages caus·e:d by such negli-
g-enee or willful misconduct (except as otherwise 
provided in the next succeeding subse0tion). 
" (e) In the event a minor deposits or there 
is deposited upon his behalf proof of financial re-
sponsibility in respeet to the operation of a motor 
vehicle owned by him, or if not the owner of a 
motor vehicle, then with respect to the operation 
of any motor vehicle, in form and in amounts as 
required under the motor vehicle financial respon-
:;;ibility laws of this state, then the department 
may accept the application of such minor when 
signed by owe parent or the gwardian of such 
minor, and while such proof is maintained such 
parent or guardian shall not be subject to the 
liability imposed under the preceding subsection 
of this section. 
'' (d) Any person who has signed the appli-
cation of a 1?tinor for a license may thereafter file 
with the department a verified written request 
that the license of said minor so granted be can-
celled. Thereupon the department shall cancel the 
license of said minor and the person who signed 
the application of such minor shall b~ relieved 
from the liability imposed under this act by reason 
of having signed such application on account of 
any subsequent negligence or willful misconduct 
of such minor in operating a motor vehiele. 
'' (e) The department upon receipt of satis-
factory evidence of the death of the person or 
persons who signed the application of a minor for 
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4 
a license shall cancel such license and shall not 
issue a new license until such time as a new ap-
plication, duly signed and verified, is made as 
required by this act. This provision shall not ap-
ply in the event the milnor has attained the age of 
eighteen ye1ars. 
"·(f) All operators' licenses issued to per-
sons who are under the age of eighteew years at 
the effective date of this act are hereby cancelled 
until they have been duly reapplied for as pro-
vided in this section.'' 
It should be noted that the provisions of this statute 
use the wording "minor" and "eighteen years." Before 
this section can be made applicable, it is only logical that 
both of these terms should be given effect. Appellant's 
contention that the word "minor" should be given no 
effect at all is entirely without reason. It should be noted 
that in the act relating to the licensing of motor vehicle 
operators and chauffeurs, Section 57-4-3, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943, provides definitions for some of the 
terms used therein. It should be further noted that the 
word "minor" is not defined specifically for purpose of 
this act. However, under the terms of 57-4-3, subsection 
(d) the term ''person'' is defined. Said s·ection provides: 
''PERSON. Every natural person, firm, co-
partnership, association or corporation.'' 
It must he assumed that the legislature intended some 
meaning to be given to the term "minor," therefore, 
it is necessary that we seek the definition of that term 
as used in Section 14-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
to-wit: 
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"The period of nlinority extends in males to 
the ag·e of twenty-one years and in fen1ales to that 
of eig-hteen years; but all minors obtain their 
1najori ty by marriage.'' 
Respondents agree with the statement made by Ap-
pellant that the pri1nary rule of construction of statutes 
i~ to ascertain and declare the intention of legislature 
and to carry such intention into effect in the fullest 
degree. (See Appellant's brief, pages 5 and 6). By thus 
giYing effect to each portion of the statute, particularly 
the wording "minor" and "eighteen years," it is evident 
that a married woman, even though under eighteen years 
of age, would not be subject to the provisions of Section 
57--l-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, the statute which 
imputes the negligence o:f a minor to the person who 
signed the application for his driver's license. Appellant 
states on page 7 of its brief: 
"If the word is to be defined as defendant 
contended, in section (c) the word "minor" could 
mean a male person of nineteen years, which is 
obviously not the intention of the statute.'' 
Appellant has again forgotten that the wording of the 
statute should be followed wherever it is clear and the 
statute specifically states, ((.a minor under the age of 
eighteen yea,rs." Therefore, a male person nineteen 
years of age would obviously not come within the terms 
of the statute. 
This precise question, as far as counsel can deter-
mine, has never been decided in any other jurisdiction. 
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However, the statutes and cases which bear on questions 
relating to this point, give us a full insight into the in-
tention of the legislature. The legislature, if it intended 
that every person (as defined in the act) under the age 
of eighteen years should be required to have their appli-
cation signed by a responsible person, as set forth in the 
act, would have used the word ''person'' rather than 
interposing the term "minor" throughout the statute. 
The word u person" is adeqwately defined in the driver's 
license act .and has been used~ itn other portions of the act. 
Appellant on page 10 of its brief states as follows: 
"If Section 1, Chapter 1, Title 14, is read into 
the statute, the ludicrous situation of a married 
female having a right to drive, regardless of 
whether she had attained the age of sixteen years, 
occurs.'' 
The only ludicrousness mentioned herein is Appellant's 
statement, for it is apparent that he has failed to read 
the drive-r's license act. Section 57-4-7 Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1943, Subsection (a) provides: 
"An operator's license shall not be granted to 
any person under the age of sixteen years and a 
chauffeur's license shall not be granted to any 
person under the age of eighteen years.'' 
It is obvious from the reading of this statute and 
the definition set up by the legislation of the term person 
that sixteen years of age is the minimum requirement for 
an operator's license and ·eighteen years the minimum re-
quirement for a chauffeur's license. The legislature when 
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7 
it intended to include everyone or exclude everyone from 
the tern1s of the dri\'er's license aet has used the word 
"person." This is apparent in Se·ction 57-4-8, Subse-ction 
(b) which reatls as follo\vs: 
":No person \vho is under the age of twenty-
:'-even years shall drive any school bus * * *.'' 
The word ''minor'' must be given some meaning 
for the simple reason that it clearly indicates a different 
connotation than the word ''person.'' The position of 
respondents is supported by authorities in other states. 
The Oregon legislature in 1939, aware of the: very ques-
tion which is now before this court, amended their law 
to substitute the word "person'' for the word "minor." 
(Laws of 1939 c 354, par. 4). Paragraph 115-209, Volume 
8, Oregon Compiled Laws Annotated, 1939, now reads 
as follo·ws : 
''The Secretary of State shall not grant the 
application of any person under the age of eight-
een years for an instruction permit, operator's 
license, or a special permit to operate motor ve-
hicles unless such application is signed by the 
father of the applicant, if the father is living and 
has custody of the applicant, otherwise, by the 
mother or guardian having the custody of such 
person, or, in the event a person under the age of 
eighteen years has no father, mother, or guardian, 
then an operator's license shall not be granted to 
such person, unless his application therefore is 
signed b:v his en1ployer." 
The Oregon legislature made this change cognizant 
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of Paragraph 63-502, Volume 5, Oregon Compiled Laws 
Annotated, 1939, which gives substantially the same 
definition of minority as Section 14-1-1 Utah Code An-
notated, 19·43. Said section provides : 
''All female persons shall be deemed to have 
arrived at the age of majority upon their being 
married according to law***'' 
Appellant cites the case of Easterly v. Cook, 140 Cal. 
App. 115, 35 P. 2d 164, to sustain its position. In this 
case the court held that the fact that a female person 
under the age of eighte:en had married did not relieve 
the person who had signed her operator's license from 
responsi'bility for the negligent or willful misconduct 
of said female person. However, to arrive at an under-
stan:ding of the court's decision, it is necessary that the 
California law be recognized. Section 25 of the California 
Civil Code at the time this case was decided read as 
follows: 
''Minors are all persons under twenty-one 
years of age ; provided, that this section shall be 
subject to the provisions of the titles of this code 
on marriage and shall not be construed as repeal-
ing or limiting the provisions of section 204 of this 
code; provided, further that any female who has 
oontracted a lawful marriage wnd is of the age of 
eighteen or over, shall be deemed to be of the age 
of majority and to be an adult person for the 
purpos·e of e·ntering into any engagement or trans-
action respecting property or her estate, or for 
the purpose of entering into any contract, the 
same as if she was twenty-one ~-ears of age." 
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Furthermore, the California Motor Vehicle Code 
takes into consideration the question which is now before 
this court. California :Motor Vehicle Code, Section 350, 
reads as follows : 
''(a) (Persons deemed minors: Signing and 
verification of application by parents, par·ent, 
guardian or custodian). For the purposes of this 
section, all persons wnder twenty-one ye(J)rs of 
age, exce,pt eighteen years of age or over who 
have been married, shall be deemed to be minors. 
No application for an operator's or chauffeur's 
license shall be gran ted by the department to 
any minor unless such application is signed and 
verified by the father and mother of such minor, 
if both father and mother are living and have 
custody of the minor; provided, however, that 
"1. If neither parent is living or has custody 
the application shall be signed and verified by 
the guardian ; or if there is no guardian, by a 
person having custody of the minor. 
'' 2. If only one parent is living or has ·custo-
dy, the application shall be signed and verified by 
such parent. 
'' (b) (Married minor under 18) If a minor 
under the age of 18 ye.ars is married, the applica-
tion may be sign·ed and verified by the adult 
spouse of such minor or by the parents of either 
spouse or in lieu of such signature, such minor 
may file proof of ability to respond in damages 
as provided in section 414 of the Vehicle Code. 
•' (c) (Where required signers are nonresi-
dents or the minor is emancipated) If the person 
or persons required to sign and verify the appli-
cation of a minor, are not residents of this State, 
or if such minor is emancipated other than by 
marriage, the department may accept an appli-
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cation signed and verified by the minor and ac-
companied by proof of ability to respond in 
damages, as provided in section 414 of the Y ehicle 
Code. 
" (d) (Suspension of license on failure of 
proof of ability to r·espond in damages) If, at any 
time during the minority of the person who has 
given proof of ability to respond in damages, such 
proof shall fail, then the depart·ment shall forth-
with suspend such license until proof of such 
licensee's continued ability to respond in future 
damages has been given or until such minor has 
otherwise complied with the requirements of 
this code relative to the issuance of an operator's 
or chauffeur's lieense. 
'' (e) (Signing and verification only by 
minor, accompanied by proof of ability to respond 
in damages) If the person or persons who are 
hereinbefore required by the provisions of this 
code to sign and verify the application of such 
minor give their written consent, the department 
may accept an application signed and verified only 
by the minor and accompanied by proof of ability 
to respond in dmnages, as provided in section 
414 of the Vehicle Code. Such person or persons 
giving the consent to but not signing or verifying 
said application, as provided in this section, shall 
not be subject merel~' by reason of having given 
such consent to the civil liability specified in sub-
divisions (a) and (b) of section 352 hereof." 
Hence, in California a married person under the age 
of eighteen years is still a minor. It is for this reason 
that the court in the Easterly case refers to the defendant 
woman as a minor, even though she had been married. 
By such reasoning the imputation of negligence of a 
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11 
minor under the age of eighteen years would include 
every '·person" under the age of eighteen years. If the 
Utah legislature had intended that such a position be 
incorporated into the Utah law, it would have been very 
simple for then1 to have said so. However, their express 
language definitely indicates their intention to exclude 
such a proposition. 
Even though this particular question has never been 
decided in other jurisdictions, there are cases which have 
dealt with this section regarding the imputation of 
negligence. In the case of Houston v. Holmes, a Missis-
sippi case, 202 :Jiiss. 300, 303, 32 So. 2d 138, 139, the court 
held that a father who had signed the original license 
for his son but not a renewal license, that the negligence 
of the son thereafter could not be imputed to the father. 
The court states at page 139 (So. 2d) as follows: 
''Statutes in derogation of the common law, 
are, as a general rule, strictly construed. City of 
Jackson v. Wallace, 189 Miss. 252, 259, 196 So. 223. 
Under which rule, legislation creating a liability 
where no liability existed at common law should 
be construed most favorably to the person· or en-
tity subj·ected to the liability, and against the 
claimant for damages. 50 Am. Jur. Statutes, Sec. 
402, P. 426. Such a statutory liability is not to he 
extended 'beyond that which is clearly indicated 
by express terms or by necessary implication from 
the language used;' statutes creating liabilities 
which did not exjst at common law although sup-
posed to be founded on consideration of public 
policy and general convenience are not to be ex-
tended beyond the plain intent of the words of 
the statute.'' 
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In the case of Hill v. Harris, 87 N.E. 2d 97, 101, in 
the court of Common Pleas, the court stated: 
"It must be conceded that in the absence of 
legislation to the contrary Samuel L. Harris, as 
the father of R:obert Harris, and in the abs·ence of 
agency, would not be liable for a tort committed 
by his son. Since the legislature has spoken on 
the subject the language of the statute enacted 
by it changing the common law rule must be 
strictly construed * * * '' 
In the case of Weber v. Punyarn, 9 Cal. 2d 226, 229, 70 
P. 2d 183, 185, the California court stated: 
'' * * * Since the imputed negligence statute 
created a new right of action, giving a remedy 
against a party who would not otherwise be liable, 
it must be strictly construed. Such was the hold-
ing in Cook v. Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County 12 Cal. App. 2d 608, 611; 55 P. 2d 12271 
1228, when the court cited 59 Corpus Juris, P. 
1129, reading: 'A statute cr·eating a new liability, 
or even a remedial statute giving a remedy 
against a party who would not otherwise be liable, 
must be strictly construed in favor of the persons 
sought to be subject to their operation.' * * *" 
Also see in accord Hanmabass v. Ryan, 164 Va. 519; 
180 S.E. 416. 
The Appellant states at page 13 of its brief: 
"The statute dearly provides for the method 
of one seeking to be relieved of such responsibility 
and he may not adopt another means at his own 
convenience.'' 
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The Appellant contend8 that the filing of a verified writ-
ten request with the driver's license department of the 
State Tax Com.Inission is the only means whereby he can 
be relieved of the responsibility for signing the original 
application of a minor. Of course, this is not so because 
the statute explicitly provides that such responsibility 
ceases upon the department receiving satisfactory evi-
dence of the death of the person who signed the applica-
tion (57 --1-12 (e) U CA, 1943) ; these provisions do not 
apply in the event the minor has attained the age of 
eighteen years (57 -4-12 (c) U CA, 1943) ; furthermore, 
it has been held in California under a statute similar in 
purpose to the Utah statute, that the liability of the 
person who signs it terminated with the expiration of the 
license. Therefore, if in addition a temporary license or 
an instruction permit had been signed by the parent, upon 
the expiration of such a license the liability of the original 
signer would cease. The California court in the case of 
Sommers 'C. Van Der Linden, 24 Cal. App. 2d 375, 378, 
379; 73 P. 2d 83, 85, 86, states: 
''The contention that the legallia:bility of the 
parents for the minor's negligence continued be-
yond the date on which the license expired is not 
persuasive . . . Since the primary purpose of the 
application required to be made by the provisions 
of subdivision (a) of Section 62 of the act was 
for the issuance of a license which the statute 
ordained should automatically expire two years 
after the date of issuance, we are impelled to the 
conclusion that the vicarious liability imposed by 
subdivision. (b) of the aforesaid section ended 
when the lic2nse expired." 
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Appellant states at page 11 of its brief: 
u If the word' mirvor' is consttrUed to exclude 
a ma,rried woman under the age of eighteen years, 
the interpretation l0ads to unnecess1ary technicali-
ties." 
Appellant has failed to state the nature of these un-
necessary technicalities and respondents have been un-
able to determine what the appellant may have had in 
mind. It appears to respondents that it is fairly simple 
procedure to determine whether an individual is under 
eighteen years of age and, furthermore, to determine 
whether said individual is a minor. Therefore, if an 
individual is under eighteen years of age and furthermore 
a minor, then Section 57-4-12 is applicable. Respondents 
are heartily in agreement with the Utah case of Taft v. 
Glade, et al, ______ Utah ______ , 201 P. 2d 285, 287, which Appel-
lant cites at page 7 of its brief, to-wit: 
'' * * * If reasonably possible effect should 
be given to every part of a statute and if the enact-
ment is subject to one or more interpretations by 
reason of conflicting provisions, then that con-
struction which will harmonize and give effect to 
all provisions is preferred.'' 
It is unreasonable to require that a married adult 
woman secure the signature of a parent even in the event 
said adult married wmnan deposits proof of financial re-
sponsibility with the Tax Commission. This would be the 
result if Appellant's theory were followed in applying 
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Section 37 --±-12 (c) DCA, 1943, which reads in part as 
follows: 
'·In the event a minor deposits ... proof of 
financial responsibility ... then the department 
may accept the application of such mino.r when 
signed by one parent or the guardian of such 
n1inor, * * • '' 
A married woman in this status is not under the custody 
or cont,-,ol of her parents and it would be unreasonable 
to conclude that she is under the custod.y mnd control of 
her huband. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion respondents assert that appellant's 
hypothesis, which he would ha~e the court legislate into 
the statute, is unreasonable and fails to give ,effect to the 
full statute. The statute (57-4-12 DCA 1943) expresses 
the intention of the legislature in plain and simple 
language, easily understood and there is no reason to 
complicate it. JoAnn Wagstaff was an adult married 
woman at the date of the accident and not a minor, there-
fore, the provisions of 57-4-12 UCA 1943, a~e not appli-
cable. Judgment for respondents should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McCULLOUGH, BOYCE & 
McCULLOUGH, 
Attorneys for Defendarnts and 
Respondents. 
By Leland S. MeCullough of counsel 
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